Policing the Global Economy: The Threat to Private Enterprise by Weidenbaum, Murray L & Fejfar, Mary A
Washington University in St. Louis 
Washington University Open Scholarship 
Murray Weidenbaum Publications Weidenbaum Center on the Economy, Government, and Public Policy 
Formal Publication 61 
4-1-1984 
Policing the Global Economy: The Threat to Private Enterprise 
Murray L. Weidenbaum 
Washington University in St Louis 
Mary A. Fejfar 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/mlw_papers 
 Part of the Economics Commons, and the Public Policy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Weidenbaum, Murray L. and Fejfar, Mary A., "Policing the Global Economy: The Threat to Private 
Enterprise", Formal Publication 61, 1984, doi:10.7936/K7RJ4GMZ. 
Murray Weidenbaum Publications, https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/mlw_papers/61. 
Weidenbaum Center on the Economy, Government, and Public Policy — Washington University in St. Louis 
Campus Box 1027, St. Louis, MO 63130. 
Other publications available in this series: 
44. Big Government and Small Business: The Changing Relationship, 
Kenneth W. Chilton and David P. Hatfield · 
48. The Economics of Retirement, Powell Niland 
49. The Myth of Runaway Bureaucracy: The Case of the FTC, Barry R. 
Weingast and Mark J. Moran 
50. Public Policy Excesses: Government by Congressional Subcommit-
tee, Cifford M. Hardin, Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast 
51. The Political Economy of the Clean Air Act: Regional Self-Interest in 
Environmental Regulation, B. Peter Pashigian 
52. Social Security: Toward a More Equitable and Rational System, 
Martha N. Ozawa 
53. Toward a More Open Trade Policy, Murray L. Weidenbaum 
54. The Next Step in Regulatory Reform: Updating the Statutes. 1983 
Report on Regulatory Budgets, Murray L. Weidenbaum and Ronald 
J. Penoyer 
55. Company Retirement Plans Eight Years After ERISA, Arthur T. 
Denzau and Clifford M. Hardin 
56. Confessions of a One-Armed Economist, Murray L. Weidenbaum 
57. Will an "Industrial Policy" Work for the United States? Arthur 
T. Denzau 
58. Regulation of Business by International Agencies, Mary A. Fejfar 
59. Regulatory Reform: A Report Card for the Reagan Administration, 
Murray L. Weidenbaum 
60. Labor Relations in Transition: Bankruptcy Law vs. Labor Law, 
Kenneth W. Chilton and Ronald J. Penoyer, editors 
Additional copies are available from: 
Center for the Study of American Business 
Washington University 
Campus Box 1208 
St. Louis, Missouri 63130 
Phone: (314) 889-5630 rl WASHINGTOI'J UNIVERSITY IN STLOUIS 
Policing the Global Economy: 
The Threat to Private Enterprise 
by Murray L. Weidenbaum and Mary A. Fejfar 
I 
Center for the 
Study of 
American Business 
Washington University ·St. louis 
This booklet is one in a series designed to enhance 
the understanding of the private enterprise system 
and the key forces affecting it. The series provides 
a forum for considering vital current issues in 
public policy and for communicating these views 
to a wide audience in the business, government, 
and academic communities. Publications include 
papers and speeches, conference proceedings, and 
other research results of the Center for the Study 
of American Business. 
Policing the Global Economy: 
The Threat to Private Enterprise 
by Murray L. Weidenbaum and Mary A. Fejfar 
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF AMERICAN BUSINESS 
Formal Publication Number 61 
April 1984 
Contents 
Introduction .................................................. . 
Regulation of Business Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
The UN Attack on Multinational Business . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
Controlling ''The Common Heritage of Mankind'' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
European Community Labor Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
Regulation of Marketing Activities ................................. 5 
Consumer Protection, UN Style . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
The Europeans Move Toward Advertising Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
Regulation of the Finance Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
Regulation of Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
Regulation of Services ........................................... 11 
Regulation of Information ..................................... .. 12 
Summary and Conclusions ....................................... 13 
Notes ......................................................... 15 
Introduction 
International organizations are increasingly involving themselves in the 
regulation of private enterprise. This new burst of regulation does not ap-
pear to be primarily motivated by a desire to improve business perform-
ance. Rather, the new style of regulation is aimed at more fundamental, 
political objectives ranging from protectionist measures by the European 
Economic Community to the efforts of United Nations' agencies to 
redistribute income and wealth. 
To compound the problem, the advocates of this new array of regula-
tion seem to have overlooked-and certainly have not learned any lessons 
from -the shortcomings of existing regulation of business in the devel-
oped countries. Study after study has demonstrated that government regu-
lators have so often been oblivious to the burdens that they impose on the 
private sector and, far more fundamentally, that such rules, regulations, 
and directives often do little to advance their stated social objectives. In 
fact, in practice they are often counterproductive. One key finding 
permeates virtually all serious analyses of government regulation of busi-
ness: it is the consumer who ultimately bears the burden that government, 
wittingly or unwittingly, attempts to impose on business. 
The European Economic Community (EEC) and the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) are firmly instituted as 
promulgators of rules by which business must abide. The UN, in com-
parison, is in its infancy as a regulatory body. Many of its measures are in 
an evolving state, often having less to do with economic concerns than 
representing a political effort by developing countries to increase their 
share of the world's wealth and income. 
Some of the international agency actions are broad; others are directed 
at specific business activities. Some of these regulatory efforts are in 
development or in negotiation stages, in the form of "advisory resolu-
tions" or "voluntary guidelines." But in a growing number of instances, 
the regulations are legally binding treaties. The form in which they cur-
rently exist is often an indication of the "next step" that will be taken in 
the international regulatory process. Yesterday's studies lead to today's 
"voluntary guidelines" which, in turn, become the basis for the treaties 
and directives of tomorrow. 
These regulatory activities cover virtually every function of the business 
firm-operations, marketing, finance, technology, services, and informa-
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The consumer ultimately bears the burden that government, 
wittingly or unwittingly, attempts to impose on business 
tion. Table I provides an overview of the primary agencies seeking to 
become ''international cops'' and the business functions they wish to 
police. This report reviews international regulatory efforts in each of these 
six areas of business decision making. 
Regulation of Business Operations 
The UN Attack on Multinational Business 
Of the proposals or actions of agencies designed to control the day-to-
day operations of private companies, the most ambitious is the United 
Nations draft code of conduct for multinational corporations (or so-called 
transnational enterprises). 1 The MNC Code is being developed by a com-
mission of the Economic and Social Council. About two-thirds of the 
Code's 7I provisions have been agreed upon. The scope of the Code goes 
beyond the definition of multinational corporations in the existing 
scholarly literature. The latter is limited to companies which produce 
goods and services in more than one country and where there is more than 
one center of corporate decision making. Unilever and Royal Dutch Shell 
are the classic examples. But the Code would apparently cover almost any 
company that tries to sell its products to people in another country. In the 
modern world, that includes virtually every large company and many 
middle-size and smaller firms. 
The vague language contained in some sections of the Code is scary 
enough to make any sensible company think twice before investing in 
overseas locations, where it might run afoul of the Code when it is pro-
mulgated. An example is the provision that multinational corporations 
should "avoid practices, products or services which cause detrimental ef-
fects on cultural patterns and socio-cultural objectives as determined by 
government." Where is the historical perspective of the authors of the 
Code? Over the centuries, civilization has been advanced by the transna-
tional (to use that deadly term) flow of science, art, music, literature 
and-yes-culture and commerce. Moreover, should the UN encourage 
the governments of its member nations to set "socio-cultural objectives" 
and require private enterprise to follow the "cultural patterns" set by 
government? This is not a traditional function of government regulation 
in a free society. However, it is a mechanism used by totalitarian rulers to 
enforce their power. 
Many of the organizations representing the business community on 
these matters have offered a weak response-asking only that the MNC 
Code be made voluntary and that, if passed, it apply also to state-owned 
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firms. That kind of response is inadequate. The Code is a misguided in-
strument and its basic rationale must be reconsidered in a fundamental 
way. After all, the private corporation has been the key to the successful 
development of Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Japan, and other 
The vague language contained in the MNC Code is scary 
enough to make any sensible company think twice before 
investing in overseas locations if the Code is promulgated 
developing societies that have prospered in our own time. In fact, Japan 
has succeeded in moving from the developing to the developed category in 
this century, and it did so without an MNC Code. 
Controlling "The Common Heritage of Mankind" 
The most sweeping UN regulation of private enterprise is in the area of 
natural resources and mining. The most important example is the Law of 
the Sea Treaty, adopted in April 1982. 2 The United States is not a 
signatory. 
To receive approval for sea mining, a private firm must agree to trans-
fer any technology it uses to the "Enterprise" (a unit operating under UN 
auspices) or to developing countries for "fair and reasonable commercial 
terms." Also, the company must provide, for each site mined, informa-
tion on a second seabed site to be reserved for the Enterprise or develop-
ing countries. Private firms are, therefore, forced to subsidize and build 
the Enterprise, the same unit which competes with private enterprise. 
A redistributive scheme similar to this one is contained in the UN's 
1980 Moon Treaty. 3 That is another attempt by other nations to "free 
ride" on Western technological innovation. Since the treaty declares that 
"the moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of man-
kind," any benefits accruing from those resources must be shared, and an 
international regime will be established to oversee extraction of those 
resources. Financial incentives to private industry for space exploration 
are greatly reduced, since developing countries share in the benefits but 
not the costs of commercial activity in space. 
European Community Labor Restrictions 
Labor practices have also been the focus of international regulatory ef-
forts of business operations. The European Community (EEC) has been 
developing proposals aimed to give labor an increased voice in managerial 
decision making. 
For example, the proposed Fifth Directive, now in its final legislative 
stages, institutes a system of worker participation in corporate manage-
ment.4 Companies with over 1000 employees would be covered. One pro-
vision under consideration says that one third to one half of each cor-
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porate board should consist of labor representatives. This would certainly 
alter labor-management relations, but it is not clear that the change would 
be for the better. Certainly, shareholder interests would readily become 
subordinate to employee interests in this type of arrangement. 
Another proposed directive is designed to promote greater worker in-
fluence over management prerogatives. It would require parent companies 
to supply decision making information to the management of subsidiaries 
operating in the EEC. The information would then be disclosed to employee 
representatives. Commonly known as the "Vredeling Proposal," it has 
been toned down from its original form which required companies to sub-
mit biannual management reports to workers, including information on 
The Vredeling Proposal would not only hamper managerial 
efficiency, but could also erode job security for workers it 
is designed to protect 
plans for manufacturing and work procedures. In its current form the 
proposal requires management to annually inform employee represen-
tatives of the company structure, financial situation, production and sales 
forecasts, employment trends, and investment programs. Managers would 
also have to consult employees on major decisions such as plant closings. 
Imagine how these proposals could affect the managerial efficiency of 
operations. How would the management of a firm with a fifty percent 
labor representation on its board attempt to decide between an ''effi-
cient," capital-intensive production process and a labor-intensive, less ef-
ficient one? The irony is, of course, that foregoing investment in the more 
efficient technology would ultimately make the firm less competitive and, 
thus, the "saved" job might not be saved for long. Under such circum-
stances, the proposed directive would not only hamper managerial effi-
ciency, but it would erode job security for the workers it is designed to 
protect. 
Regulation of Marketing Activities 
Companies involved in international marketing of products face a 
variety of regulatory measures. In recent years, the most well known of 
these actions has been the Infant Formula Code, adopted in 1981 by the 
UN's World Health Organization. 5 This Code calls for a wide variety of 
restrictions on the marketing and distribution of breast milk substitutes, 
applying not only to advertising of the product and distribution of 
samples, but also to labeling requirements and even the activities and 
compensation of marketing personnel. The Infant Formula Code is not 
legally binding, but governments are encouraged to enact legislation for 
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its implementation, and some private companies have been pressured into 
accepting it. 
It turns out that the Infant Formula Code is not the exception but the 
"entering wedge" for broader UN regulation of private enterprise. The 
World Health Organization is now considering formulating a code on the 
marketing of pharmaceuticals. It would create an international drug ap-
proval program and possibly include international rules on drug labeling 
and advertising. Such action would be in addition to WHO's existing 
Essential Drug Program, which lists 250 "essential" generic drugs 
necessary for adequate health care that must be made available to 
developing countries. Other suggestions for UN supervision include 
chemicals and related products. 
Consumer Protection, UN Style 
The UN's Economic and Social Council is considering a sweeping con-
sumer protection code that would create new obstacles to international 
trade via controls on product advertising, safety, quality, and pricing. The 
proposed Guidelines advocate replacing the present reliance on market 
competition-reflective of consumer choices-with a system of govern-
ment regulation. When we look beyond their label, it is apparent that the 
Guidelines are a model of vagueness and over-blown phraseology. Grand 
The U.N.'s Consumer Protection Guidelines would interfere 
with the goal of open international trade by establishing 
a new set of non-tariff barriers 
goals are set forth in sweeping language that is, at best, highly generalized 
and unclear. The Guidelines would interfere with the goal of open inter-
national trade by establishing a new set of non-tariff barriers. The follow-
ing few examples of the many shortcomings of the Guidelines make it 
clear that "protecting the consumer" is the furthest thing from the minds 
of the drafters of this code. 
The Draft Guidelines contain seven objectives which are supposedly 
written "with special emphasis on the needs of developing nations." But 
one objective is "to facilitate production patterns geared to meeting the 
most important needs of consumers." In economies organized along 
private enterprise lines, the needs of consumers are always the strongest 
influence on "production patterns"; the pressures of the marketplace dic-
tate that. But the Guidelines suggest the need for a controlled, highly cen-
tralized economy in which consumer choices are in practice limited by the 
decisions of an all-wise government. This objective strongly implies that a 
central government must identify, and then control, the means of achiev-
ing the "most important needs" of consumers. We need only consult the 
dismal record of any of the world's centrally planned economies in 
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feeding their citizens to know that promulgating this objective would 
severely hurt the developing nations. 
Moreover, this objective overlooks the importance of world trade in 
meeting the needs of consumers. Most growing economies gear produc-
tion for international markets rather than only for the so-called ''more 
important needs" of their own consumers. The case of Japan is instruc-
tive. If its post-war economy had been limited to meeting the needs of its 
own population, it surely would not enjoy the strong position in world 
markets and the high standard of living that it has today. 
One general principle in the Guidelines raises grave concerns: 
the right to economic safety from offenses or malpractices which 
deny consumers optimum benefit within their economic resources. 
This phraseology may sound like mere gibberish, but given the propensity 
of totalitarian regimes, particularly communist governments, to throw 
people in jail for "economic offenses" against the state, this provision is 
potentially quite dangerous. 
Here's another provision: 
Business practices affecting the processing and distribution of food 
products and especially the marketing of highly refined and 
expensive food products should be regulated in order to ensure that 
such practices do not conflict with consumers' interest or 
government aims in the area of food policy. 
Why are "highly refined and expensive food products" singled out 
here? What all-wise power in a nation is going to determine that a specific 
category of food products presents a "conflict" with the interests of con-
sumers, while another category does not? In free societies with market 
economies, it is the consumers themselves who make these decisions, pro-
tecting their "interests" by not buying the product. The true purpose of 
this provision appears to be to project "government aims" in food policy. 
The Europeans Move Toward Advertising Restrictions 
Regulatory actions restricting consumers' choices are not limited to the 
UN. The European Economic Community (EEC) is currently involved in 
an effort to control the content of product advertising. The proposed 
Directive on Misleading and Unfair Advertising assigns liability to firms if 
The EEC's proposed Directive on Misleading and Unfair 
Advertising assigns liability to firms if products 
do not "satisfy" consumer expectations "aroused" 
through advertising 
products do not "satisfy" consumer expectations "aroused" through 
advertising. 6 The advertiser would also bear the burden of proof to 
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substantiate any claims made in the ad. 
The clout of the directive will rest in the definition and interpretation of 
"misleading" and "unfair" advertising. The precise wording of these 
definitions is under debate in the EEC. 
Broad definitions can be interpreted in a variety of ways. For example, 
assume a normally unobjectionable ad depicting a slim, smiling person 
drinking a diet soda on a hot day. What is the reasonable expectation to 
be construed from the ad? For one person it may be to have one's thirst 
quenched; for another, it might be to drink one's way to model-like thin-
ness. Who is to determine which, if either, of these consumer expectations 
is ''reasonable'' enough to hold a company liable for misleading the con-
sumer if his or her hopes are not met? 
It is also clear that consumer preferences and expectations about prod-
ucts differ widely. One of the primary purposes of advertising is to show 
why a product is superior to its competition. A directive holding the 
advertiser liable for pointing out flaws in its competitors' products-
"unfair" advertising-could lead to a myriad of costly legal suits unless 
"unfair" can be specified precisely. Penalizing a firm for advertising 
genuinely superior characteristics of its products because these statements 
could ''harm the commercial reputation of a competitor'' lessens the 
rewards for innovation and could lead to reduced consumer choice. 
Regulation of the Finance Function 
The finance functions of international firms are also becoming increas-
ingly subject to the watchful eye of the UN. For example, information 
disclosure and accounting practices have come under the scrutiny of a 
variety of organizations. The proposed MNC Code mentioned earlier calls 
for public disclosure of a wide range of company financial data and 
would give national governments the justification for extending those data 
requirements to cover many other aspects of a company's international 
operations. Again, there seems to be little awareness of the benefits and 
costs-and advantages and limitations-of the existing national regula-
tions requiring such paperwork. 
Also, the UN Center on Transnational Corporations is collecting data 
on direct foreign investment by multinational corporations. Supposedly, 
such information will be furnished to developing countries to help them 
gain greater influence over private business. The very selective interest of 
this new form of business regulation is intriguing. 
International financial regulation is far more developed in the EEC. 
Firms operating within the European community are becoming painfully 
aware of the increased costs of these restrictions. Standards on the 
preparation of annual financial reports-accounting categories, asset 
valuation rules, capitalization of companies, inflation accounting, and 
auditing procedures-are mandated under the Fourth Company Directive, 
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Firms operating within the European community are 
becoming painfully aware of the increased costs of 
international financial regulation 
adopted in 1978. 7 
As is often the case in international regulatory efforts, rules beget more 
rules. In 1983 the EEC adopted the Seventh Company Directive which ex-
pands upon the previous reporting requirements. The new rules require 
corporations operating in the EEC, including holding companies and 
groups of companies, to make public financial reports on their subsidiary 
operations. The reporting requirements depend upon the level of parent-
company ownership. The regulations apply whether or not the head-
quarters of the controlling company is within the EEC. 
In addition, a controversial, if not radical, Ninth Directive is in the 
works which would require parent companies to legally define responsibil-
ities and liabilities to their subsidiaries in EEC countries. Corporations 
would have to define specific decision making responsibilities either by 
contract or some other explicit legal means-a "legal declaration." 
Parent companies could then be held liable to investors, suppliers and 
employees for damage to subsidiary interests resulting from decisions to 
phase out or even to merely change the operating nature of a subsidiary 
unit. 
The difficulty in protecting the varied parties with economic interests 
via such a regulation is obvious. Imagine a situation in which reducing 
operations at a subsidiary will produce long-term gains for the parent 
company. Should the interests of the subsidiary investors and employees 
be favored over those of the parent company? Would the parent company 
be liable for subsidiary company losses due to poor management within 
the subsidiary? 
Whatever the original intent of this regulation -and it appears to be 
little more than paranoia about multinational firms-its effect would be 
to make it prohibitively costly for parent companies to close subsidiary 
operations in host EEC countries, no matter how inefficient they might 
be. Of course, in the long run it would bring about less multinational in-
vestment in EEC nations. One of the Ninth Directive's saving features is 
that it is so complex that there is little likelihood of its passage in the im-
mediate future. 
Regulation of Technology 
Companies that sell or license highly-technology products or services to 
developing countries may be affected by the Transfer of Technology Code 
(or TOT Code) being negotiated by the UN Conference on Trade and 
Development. 8 The TOT Code attempts to define the contractual respon-
9 
sibilities of parties involved in the transfer of technology. Its sets forth 
rules for negotiating, contracting, and post-contract activities. 
For example, the technology-supplying country, upon request of the 
receiving party, is to provide specific information on various elements of 
the technology as required for "technical and financial" evaluation of the 
technology. The extent to which this is required is not clear. But if a com-
pany selling a microcomputer could be required to deliver specific infor-
mation on the components of the microprocessor, it would be giving away 
competitively sensitive and valuable information. 
What the guidelines overlook is the extent to which such regulations 
would impede the flow of technology. That certainly has been the experi-
ence in more developed nations: regulation dampens the incentive to 
develop and utilize new technology. 
Other regulations which would restrict development and flow of 
technology are measures to redesign the current international system of 
U.N. agencies have been actively trying to implement a 
new patent system allowing Third World nations to 
reap the benefits of Western technological advances without 
paying any of the costs 
patent rights. UN agencies have been actively trying to renegotiate the 
Paris Convention, which is the international treaty that defines the cur-
rent patent system. 9 Their goal is to implement a new patent system allow-
ing Third World nations to reap the benefits of Western technological 
advances without paying any of the costs. 
For example, developing countries would be able to impose compulsory 
licensing if a patent is not used within two and a half years after the 
patent is issued. Companies could be forced to forfeit the patent-that is, 
turn the technology rights over to the government-if the patent is not 
used within five years after it is granted. Industries needing product 
approval for manufacturing or marketing after patenting could be sev-
erely affected. For example, a drug approval process could easily take 
more than the five years allowed for non-use of the patent. Thus, a patent 
could be appropriated before a company is ever allowed to manufacture 
or market the product. 
The EEC patent regulation has resulted in the establishment of protec-
tionist trade barriers. Under one such law, products patented both outside 
and within the European Community cannot be imported into EEC coun-
tries without permission of the EEC patent holder. 10 This can be a severe 
impediment to trade. 
Take, for example, a drug patented both in the U.S. and in West Ger-
many which the U.S. patent holder wishes to distribute in the Nether-
lands. Since the U.S. is not a member of the EEC, the German patent 
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holder is able to deny importation by the Netherlands of any products 
containing the patented drug which the German patent holder also 
markets abroad. This type of regulation sets up an arbitrary and artificial 
system of import/export restraints with total disregard for the economics 
of the situation or consumer welfare. Not only might a more efficient 
producer of a product, in this case a drug, be denied access to markets, 
but a potential buyer, in this case a patient, would be denied the benefits 
of price competition for this technologically-advanced product. 
The UN efforts to control technology transfer through patent regula-
tion would have similar results. Those who would benefit from the intro-
duction of a new technology, especially the Third World nations, may be 
denied those benefits if developers of the technology are not allowed a 
fair return on their investment. 
Regulation of Services 
As worldwide trade in services has expanded, so have attempts by inter-
national bodies to regulate it, including banking, insurance, and even 
tourism. The UN has become particularly involved in measures to closely 
regulate the shipping industry. These activities are aimed at promoting 
companies in developing nations at the expense of existing enterprises in 
the developed nations. The centerpiece of these efforts is the Liner Code, 
developed by UNCTAD, which has just now become effective. 11 In 
essence, this Code sets up a government allotment of participation in an 
industry by strict allocation of shipping tonnage. 
Free enterprise in the shipping industry is further under attack with a 
UN effort to eliminate open registry shipping. Current shipping com-
panies could literally be forced out of business if treaty negotiations pro-
ceed according to the agenda set by developing countries. Their proposal 
includes regulation of labor, management, financing, and ownership of 
the shipping industry. For example, one objective is to require that a cer-
tain share of equity in a shipping company be held by nationals of the 
flag (registry) state of a ship. If investment capital is scarce and, there-
fore, high-priced in these countries, the shipping firm will be faced 
with the choice of paying the higher cost of capital or changing the 
registration. 
Another provision of the proposed treaty would require that a fixed 
percentage of the shipping firm's managers be nationals of the flag state. 
Experienced managers would have to be fired and new management 
trained. More important, however, is the usurpation of private decision 
making by an international agency. 
Companies that register their ships under flags of convenience or in 
open-registry countries do so because costs of fleet maintenance are lower 
in these countries. The irony is that if the UN regulations are adopted, 
these countries could lose their competitive advantage as low-cost sup-
11 
pliers of ship registrations-and thus lose the benefits hoped for and even 
the pre-regulation benefits as well. Consumers world-wide would bear the 
burden of the cost increases to the shipping firms. 
Regulation of Information 
The value of information in the world today is apparent from the in-
creasing efforts to control it. One effort to do so has been spearheaded by 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) in its notion of a New World Information Order. The stated 
aim of the Information Order is to correct the ''imbalance of information 
flow" between developed and developing nations. 
The U.N. 's New World Information Order would 
downgrade the role of the free press and enhance the 
position of government-controlled news agencies 
In 1980, a General Conference of UNESCO embraced a set of recom-
mendations which would downgrade the role of the free press and 
enhance the position of government-controlled news agencies. The recom-
mendations are quite ambitious. They include the following: 
• Restriction on news-gathering by "multinational" communications 
agencies. 
• Developing a code of ethics for journalists. 
• Exploring by the UN and the media of a means for international 
"right of reply" to news accounts. Proposals include a UN news 
service and censoring the release to the Western press of infor-
mation about the developing countries. 
• A requirement that multinational corporations supply governments 
of the nations in which they operate with information for' 'legis-
lative and administrative purposes" relevant to their activities. This 
information is intended to evaluate and monitor the companies-at the 
same time that news on the developing countries themselves would be 
controlled by governments. 
• Reducing "the influence of market and commercial considerations" 
on communications flows-thus emphasizing government-run, rather 
than privately financed, news media. 
• Developing guidelines ''with respect to advertising content and the 
values and attitudes it fosters." 12 
On December 15, 1983, the UN General Assembly took a major step 
toward instituting a system of world journalistic censorship. A resolution 
was adopted promoting the development of a New World Information 
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Order. The U.S. strongly opposes the Order. Protesting UN actions to 
limit freedom of the press, the U.S. has announced its intention to 
withdraw from UNESCO in 1985 and will take with it the U.S. funding 
contribution, which represents 25 percent of the agency's budget. 
Another form of information regulation with immediate costs to 
business is the control of data transmissions among countries. The 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has 
instituted Guidelines on the transmission of "personal" data across 
borders. 13 The Council of Europe has developed a legally binding treaty 
on the same issue. 14 It is expected to soon be ratified. Companies involved 
in transmission of "personal" data such as personnel records, supplier 
data, or direct marketing survey results would fall under jurisidiction of 
the treaty. Many companies which regularly participate in the routine pro-
cessing of these data, such as communications, banking, credit, insurance, 
tourism, entertainment, and employment services, are covered. These 
companies may be denied freedom to transmit data out of Europe unless 
they meet rigid security and data use standards. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The examples presented in this report are just that, a small sample of a 
large and rapidly growing phenomenon. Unfortunately, the public at large 
knows little about this new development. 
Americans still think of the UN as an organization devoted to peace-
keeping-the function with which it is most explicitly charged in its 
charter. There is little awareness of the extent to which the UN is becom-
ing an economic body involved in radically changing the performance and 
There is little public awareness of the extent to which the 
UN is becoming an economic body involved in radically 
changing the performance and character of private 
economies throughout the world 
character of private economies throughout the world. The UN's regulatory 
efforts focus on controlling the operations of private enterprise by pejora-
tively labeling every company that tries to do business in any other coun-
try as a "multinational" corporation or "transnational" enterprise. 
The proposals of the various units of the UN are alien to consumers in 
Western nations that thrive on private markets and the principle of com-
petition. Large private companies (the so-called multinational corpora-
tions) are given special attention-and penalized-in the UN's proposals. 
Is it because they are the major alternative to direct government control 
and operation of the economic development process? More basically, 
business firms are singled out because they pose a real threat to the 
establishment and maintenance of concentrated economic power in 
government-which is the hallmark of totalitarian societies. 
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What should be done? First of all, an educational effort is essential. 
The public needs to be made aware of the wide variety· of regulations be-
ing developed by international agencies. But the uncritical supporters of 
this new style of regulation must themselves be put on guard so that they 
understand the implications of these measures. After all, how could 
anyone initially oppose guidelines labeled as protecting the consumer? It 
takes a hard heart to question the proposed UN promulgation of such 
good things as product safety and international cooperation. The content 
of these regulatory packages, however, is far less attractive than their 
labels. It is ironic that so many of these proposed regulations that are sup-
posedly consumer-oriented would themselves flunk any truth-in-labeling 
test. 
A modest step toward educating the American public is the bill intro-
duced by Senator Larry Pressler, "The International Organizations Public 
Procedures Act." Despite its forbidding title, Senator Pressler's bill 
would simply require publication in the Federal Register of any proposal 
being considered by an international organization that may affect the 
commerce of the United States. Such action would let private citizens, in-
cluding business executives, comment on the proposal so that their views 
could be taken into account in preparing the official U.S. position on the 
matter. That would seem to be a useful step forward. 
Many international regulatory efforts are misguided. 
We should not be intimidated by the strong rhetoric 
contained in the justification for these activities 
Regardless of the motivation of their sponsors, many of these rules 
would increase costs to firms and ultimately to consumers, and create new 
barriers to the flow of trade and investment among nations. At a time 
when many of the developing nations are hard-pressed to earn the foreign 
exchange to service their existing debts, such regulation would be counter-
productive to their own needs. It is clear that the rush to regulate by the 
UN and other international agencies is misguided. We should not be 
intimidated by the strong rhetoric contained in the justification for these 
activities. 
The formal labels applied to international regulatory efforts by the UN 
and other world bodies merely cloak fundamental political concerns. On 
the surface, the proposals deal with consumer safety, family health, 
advertising, technology, and so forth. In reality, however, these efforts 
are an integral part of an old-fashioned, political power struggle. That 
struggle goes by a variety of names, but its object is clear. For those con-
cerned with free markets and free societies, it is a dangerous delusion to 
believe that they can remain spectators aloof from the consequences of 
this new, international attack on private enterprise. 
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